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Abstract
Background: The ‘database search problem’, that is, the strengthening of a case - in terms of probative value -
against an individual who is found as a result of a database search, has been approached during the last two decades
with substantial mathematical analyses, accompanied by lively debate and centrally opposing conclusions. This
represents a challenging obstacle in teaching but also hinders a balanced and coherent discussion of the topic within
the wider scientiﬁc and legal community. This paper revisits and tracks the associated mathematical analyses in terms
of Bayesian networks. Their derivation and discussion for capturing probabilistic arguments that explain the database
search problem are outlined in detail. The resulting Bayesian networks oﬀer a distinct view on the main debated
issues, along with further clarity.
Methods: As a general framework for representing and analyzing formal arguments in probabilistic reasoning about
uncertain target propositions (that is, whether or not a given individual is the source of a crime stain), this paper relies
on graphical probability models, in particular, Bayesian networks. This graphical probability modeling approach is
used to capture, within a single model, a series of key variables, such as the number of individuals in a database, the
size of the population of potential crime stain sources, and the rarity of the corresponding analytical characteristics in
a relevant population.
Results: This paper demonstrates the feasibility of deriving Bayesian network structures for analyzing, representing,
and tracking the database search problem. The output of the proposed models can be shown to agree with existing
but exclusively formulaic approaches.
Conclusions: The proposed Bayesian networks allow one to capture and analyze the currently most well-supported
but reputedly counter-intuitive and diﬃcult solution to the database search problem in a way that goes beyond the
traditional, purely formulaic expressions. The method’s graphical environment, along with its computational and
probabilistic architectures, represents a rich package that oﬀers analysts and discussants with additional modes of
interaction, concise representation, and coherent communication.
Keywords: Database search, Evidential value, Bayesian approach, Bayesian networks
Background
The emergence of DNAdatabases froma legal point of view
DNA is widely held as a category of forensic trace mate-
rial that outperforms other forensically relevant material
on parameters such as reliability. This is reﬂected by opin-
ions maintained by both members of the general public
and professional and academic areas, and exempliﬁed by
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expressions such as ‘silver bullet’ [1], the ‘most powerful
innovation in forensics since ﬁngerprinting’ [2], or a ‘per-
fect piece of evidence’ [3]. Databases represent a transient
topic in that respect. Historically, modern DNA analy-
ses were ﬁrst used as an investigative tool in an English
criminal case in 1986, when Colin Pitchfork was pros-
ecuted and convicted for the rape and murder of two
teenage girls. In the absence of a suspect, the police tested
more than 4,000 males from the region of interest (a
procedure known today as mass screening). The investi-
gation ﬁnally came upon Pitchfork - who refused to give
blood for analysis arguing that he was afraid of needles
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- only after that considerable resources and time had
been spent. At the time, DNA clearly lacked the element
that gives it the formidable investigative capacities it has
today: databases.
The ﬁrst DNA proﬁle databases were established during
the 1990sa. Since then, all major Western countries have
enacted laws allowing the establishment of DNA proﬁle
databases, but the exact conditions under which they
function vary from one jurisdiction to another. Besides,
they are still accompanied by or cause democratic debate
as to whose DNA proﬁle should be taken and kept regis-
tered.While databases may be seen as a natural byproduct
of DNA typing, they now are used daily without many
lawyers or even scientists devoting in-depth thought to
the way a search through a database could inﬂuence the
value of the DNA evidence itself. Forensic academics
though have been struggling for at least a decadeb over the
meaning of a match found through ‘trawling a database’
versus situations where suspects were found through
other investigative means (that is, without the use of
database).
The outcomes of this debate, at times led rather con-
troversially, are approached in this article from a distinct
perspective of a graphical approach. As a principal aim,
the discussion will focus on explaining how the use of a
database impacts the value assigned to a ‘match’ between
the proﬁle of a trace found on the scene of a crime and
the proﬁle of a suspect. This question appears to have no
intuitively obvious answer, and it may seem overly tech-
nical to lawyers and other legal academics, but, as further
emphasized in due course, it is in their interest to under-
stand the challenges raised by DNA databases in terms of
formal and argumentative interpretation procedures and
the impact that this may have on their area of activity.
This pairs with the more general tendency that the use
of databases has fundamentally changed the way forensic
evidence is currently processed, to the extent that, con-
trary to more traditional modes of proof, the judiciary
tends to lose control over a whole part of the administra-
tion of the evidence [4]. So to speak, and as a matter of
fact, a database can be viewed as a ‘closed box’ because its
actual inner workings remain unknown not only to most
defense lawyers, but also to many representatives of the
judiciary, namely prosecutors, judges, and juries. Besides
the challenge of interpreting the probative value of the so-
called ‘database hits’, the way in which a database is man-
aged, the way that the correctness of typing results and
registrations are controlled, or the way databases are used
for calculating so-called ‘rarity statistics’ are all topics that
remain largely outside the control of judicial actors. This is
problematic because it may lead to unawareness that such
questions could be debated and that the probative value of
matches reported to legal actors are intrinsically linked to
such issues.
From a more general point of view, questioning the
inferential assessment of database search results is a sub-
ject all the more relevant because databases are growing
continuously larger. With more people being registered
every year, database searching of DNA proﬁles from traces
of unknown origin involves comparisons with increas-
ingly larger stocks of data. This motivates investigation
of the knowledge, perception, and understanding of this
situation, along with its practical implications in judicial
proceedings. In the UK, for example, about 5% of the
populationc have had their proﬁle taken and entered into
the national DNA database, which not only comprises
proﬁles from convicted and serious oﬀenders, but also
from people implicated in minor cases. Yet, the probabil-
ity of ﬁnding a correspondence with an individual that is
not the true source is not equal to zero. With a potential
of adventitious matches, each database member thus runs
a real risk to face a charge based on a ‘database hit’. For
these reasons, questions that emanate from the use made
of matches derived from database searches, as well as the
assessment of their evidential value, are crucial and a topic
that represents ongoing interest to the legal community.
The legal perspective to interpretation of forensic evidence
Assessing the evidential signiﬁcance of results of database
searches may appear as a marginal or exotic topic, but it
is useful to consider it as part of scientiﬁc evidence inter-
pretation in the broader context of legal proceedings. In
Western countries, from an adversary as well as from an
inquisitorial tradition, this condenses to a number of core
principles even though distinct sets of legal rules gov-
ern the various countries of jurisdiction. These principles
cover, ﬁrst, the requirement that only reliable evidence is
admissible. Second, except in certain rare cases, the law
does not assign a particular or predetermined value to a
given item of evidenced. Even if, in practice, the word of an
expert witness testifying as to the meaning of a reported
match might carry some weight, it always remains the
judge’s (or the jury’s) responsibility to set and retain, in
ﬁne, the probative value. To evaluate the reliability and
value of a given piece of evidence, the decision maker is
said to be free. This concept of freedom actually refers to
the ancient modes of proof, when the law would set a hier-
archy of the diﬀerent types of evidence, from the strongest
to the weakest (with confessions being traditionally the
strongest piece of evidence). It would also set out rules
as to the relative weight of certain types of evidence. For
instance, the testimony of a man was twice as reliable as
the testimony of a woman [5]. Judges had no real power to
evaluate cases; their only duty was to count the items of
evidence presented by each party and declare the prevail-
ing side. Freedom of assessment thus only means that the
law does not assign weight to diﬀerent types of evidence.
It does not imply that judges or juries are completely free
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and can decide according to their temporary states of
mind, that is, their mere mood. In fact, the law requires
decisionmakers to proceed in a rational way, so as to avoid
unfair or arbitrary decisions.
This raises the question of what is meant by the notion
of rationality in the context of the interpretation of foren-
sic evidence. There is widespread agreement, supported
by substantive argument, on the view that judges or juries
should follow the rules of logic and of common scien-
tiﬁc knowledge and that Bayesian reasoning provides a
coherent framework to conform with this requirement
[6-8]. This approach - of which Bayesian networkse are a
schematic illustration and retained as such in this paper
- assists decision makers in their assessment of situations
in the light of new pieces of evidence, but it does not, in
itself, instruct its user about the actual probative value
that ought to be given to, for instance, a DNA match.
Once a match has been reported, it rather deﬁnes the
general rules according to which one’s beliefs should
evolve in view of the uncertain target propositions, such
as that according to which a given suspect is or is not
the source of a stain found on the crime scene. Applying
Bayes’ inference in a particular situation requires one to
specify a model. This will be the main topic of discussion
pursued in the section “The ‘island’ problem” and in later
parts of this paper.
Evidential value of ‘database hits’: two decades of debate
‘What is the strength of the evidence against a suspect
who is found as a result of the search in a database?’
This practical question, also sometimes referred to as
‘the database search problem’, has led to considerable dis-
cussion within the scientiﬁc community, including both
forensic scientists and legal practitioners. Its implica-
tions in the practice of criminal proceedings span a wide
range. The debate was led essentially in the context of
DNA evidence, but the underlying principle of searching
databases containing analytical characteristics that serve
as a basis for comparative forensic examinations applies
also to other kinds or categories of scientiﬁc evidence
[9]. Although this problem is strongly rooted in prac-
tical applications, deciding on an appropriate approach
to deal with this inference problem requires coherent
methodological developments.
Diﬀerent answers, pointing in quite contrary directions,
have been oﬀered so far but are accompanied with sub-
stantial mathematics. It is not the paper’s intention to
retrace this debate in all its respects nor to oppose com-
peting approaches. As a starting point, it suﬃces to note
that the prevalent and most well-supported viewpoint is
that a database search tends to strengthen a case against
a ‘matching’ suspect [10-18]. This paper seeks to analyze
and discuss the probabilistic tenets on which this stand-
point is founded by invoking a methodology based on
graphical probability models (that is, Bayesian networks).
Some work in this direction has already been presented
in [19,20]. A more recent paper also relied on Bayesian
networks [21], but its main focus was on a slightly dif-
ferent aspect, that is, the probability of false convictions.
This paper will concentrate on the more restricted topic
of how to infer the source of a crime stain. As will be seen,
a graphical approach using Bayesian networks allows to
demonstrate a logic that is in line with existing literature
on this topic.
Structure of the paper
This paper is organized as follows. The ‘Methods’ section
starts by providing general information about Bayesian
networks and explains the rationale behind their use as a
methodology in the study reported here. As an introduc-
tory example and an initial ﬁnding, “The ‘island’ problem”
section presents a Bayesian network approach for the
well-known ‘island problem’. This is a generic setting in
which no database is involved [22]. The discussion thus
seeks to introduce the graphical structure of probabilistic
reasoning about the source of a crime stain in a situation
where the use of a database is not an issue. This start-
ing point is chosen in order to illustrate the logic of the
extended argument that is - in later parts of the paper
- developed for situations in which the proﬁles of some
of the islanders are placed in a searchable database. This
allows to point out the logical connection between these
two evaluative scenarios. As will be seen, there are struc-
tural analogies between the two analyses, and this gives
further credit to the proposed solution for the database
setting. In particular, it will be possible to show that the
approach to the database search problem is merely a log-
ical extension of the undisputed probabilistic solution to
the island problem. In addition, the graphical interface of
Bayesian networks will be shown to provide a clear, yet
intuitively convincing explanation for an increase of the
probability of the proposition according to which amatch-
ing suspect is the source of the crime stain, once other
members of the same database are excluded (because they
are found to present non-matching proﬁles).
The section ‘When some islanders are in a database’ will
introduce the database search setting more formally. The
analyses pursued at that point focus on a stepwise presen-
tation of settings with well-deﬁned numbers of individuals
for the size of the database as well as the pool of poten-
tial crime stain donors. This aims at pointing out the
rationale underlying the conclusion in basic cases. This is
thought to further the understanding of solutions in sce-
narios that extend to more general situations presented
later in the same section. The section entitled ‘A Bayesian
network-guided derivation of the database search likeli-
hood ratio’ will reuse the previously introduced Bayesian
network in order to point out that the proposed model
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can also serve the purpose of illustrating the derivation
of a likelihood ratio. This aspect is introduced because
the previous sections mainly focused on the calculation
of posterior probabilities for main propositions (for exam-
ple, ‘the suspect is the source of the crime stain’). The
merit of a Bayesian network-guided analysis for both pos-
terior probabilities and likelihood ratios is discussed in the
‘Discussion and conclusions’ section, along with general
conclusions. Throughout the paper, the level of techni-
cality for notation and calculation does not exceed that
which is generally employed in existing legal literature on
the topic, for example [18], but readers who wish to avoid
the derivation of the mathematical background in order
to concentrate on the proposed Bayesian networks may
focus directly on the following sections: ‘Bayesian network
for the island problem,’ ‘Bayesian network for a database
search setting: suspect and one other individual in the
database,’ ‘Bayesian network for a search of a database of
size n > 2,’ and ‘Discussion and conclusions’.
Methods
Preliminaries
In the early 1980s, Bayesian networks have been devel-
oped in the ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence as an approach
that helps to apply the theory of probability to inference
problems of more substantive size and, thus, to more real-
istic and practical problems [23]. Since then, Bayesian
networks have also attracted researchers in legal sciences,
and this tendency has considerably intensiﬁed through-
out the last decade [24]. Aitken and coauthors [25,26], for
example, investigated the potential of Bayesian networks
for speciﬁc case analysis, also known as ‘oﬀender proﬁling’.
Based on a dataset covering the details of several hundred
cases of sexually motivated child murders and abduc-
tions (that is, incidents reported in Great Britain since
1960), the authors propose diﬀerent graphical models to
relate the key parameters of a case. These models may
be used to revise the probability of oﬀender characteris-
tics, given the information about the victim and the crime.
More recently, the use of Bayesian networks has also been
reported for crime risk factor analysis [27] as well as for
terrorism risk management [28]. Within forensic science,
they now constitute a major direction of research [20].
Beyond legal applications, such as the modeling of his-
torically causes ce´le`bres [29-32], Bayesian networks are
used in virtually any ﬁeld that needs to deal with inference
under circumstances of uncertainty (for example, medical
diagnosis, engineering).
Methodology
In this paper, a Bayesian network approach is proposed
because it allows one to point out the logic underlying
current probabilistic analyses of the database search prob-
lem in various ways. Making these arguments plain is
relevant not only for teaching, but also for supporting dis-
cussion within the scientiﬁc community. There is a need
for this essentially because the developments based on
formulae alone may not be found easy to apprehend by
all participants within a discussion. Yet, agreement on
such evaluative matters is essential in order to assure that
the forensic community can take a credible stance with
respect to recipients of expert information, in particu-
lar, legal decision makers (such as magistrates or courts
of law). Moreover, there are also recent recommenda-
tions from professional bodies, for example [33], that
diverge from the prevalent viewpoint stated above. This
is a cause of concern and illustrates the continuing need
for formalisms that provide support in analyzing and
communicating probabilistic approaches [21].
Results and discussion
The ‘island’ problem
General description and notation
Consider a biological stain found on a crime scene. It has
been typed and found to have the genetic proﬁle Gc. It
is assumed here that the method applied for determining
the genetic proﬁle of a biological sample works perfectly
accurate. The ‘island’ on which the crime was committed
has a population of size N. Initially, there is no informa-
tion that directs suspicion to any of the N islanders. Thus,
all of them are equally believed to be the source of the
crime stain. Since the stain is found to be of type Gc, so
must be the person fromwhich the stain comes. A suspect
comes to police attention and his blood is analyzed. He is
found to have the genetic proﬁleGs. It corresponds to that
observed for the crime stain:Gc = Gs. On the basis of this
information, the question of interest is as follows: ‘How
convinced should one be that the suspect is the source of
the crime stain?’
In order to approach this question, information about
the occurrence of the corresponding genetic proﬁle is
needed. Let us suppose that, on the basis of a survey
of a comparable population on another island, the target
proﬁle can be taken to occur in about 1% of the popu-
lation and that this rate, written as γ for short, can also
be retained for the population of the island on which
the crime stain of interest was found. It is also supposed
here that knowledge of the suspect’s genotype, Gs, does
not aﬀect one’s probability that another islander has that
proﬁle.
The formal analysis of this inference problem requires
some further notation. Within the population of N indi-
viduals, let us index the suspect as person 1 and the
remaining individuals as 2...N . Next, let the proposition
that a given person i is the source of the crime stain be
denoted as Hi. The term H1 thus stands for the propo-
sition that the suspect is the source of the crime stain.
Analogously, the propositions according to which one of
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the remainingN−1 people is the source of the crime stain
are denoted as H2, ...,HN . Throughout this paper, propo-
sitions will be abbreviated with capital letters, whereas
probability assignments will be written shorthand by
Greek symbols.
The initial probability that a given individual is the
source of the crime stain will be written as Pr(Hi) = πi.
Since it is considered, as a starting point, that each of theN
persons could be the source with equal probability, one
has πi = 1/N and∑Ni=1 πi = 1. In later sections, further
notation is introduced in order to allow for the possibility
that some of the N individuals are part of a database.
Probability that the suspect is the source of the crime stain
In the setting considered at this point, the suspect is
the only typed individual among the N persons. Let us
write M1 for the ﬁnding that his genotype, Gs, corre-
sponds to that of the crime stain, Gc. The probability that
the suspect is the source of the crime stain is then given by
Bayes’ theorem for discrete evidence andmultiple discrete
propositions:
Pr(H1 |M1) = Pr(M1 | H1)Pr(H1)Pr(M1 |H1)Pr(H1) +∑Ni=2 Pr(M1 |Hi)Pr(Hi) .
(1)
Here, the conditional probability of the evidence M1
given H1 is also called the likelihood of the propo-
sition given the evidence, sometimes written as L1.
Equation 1 can thus be given in a more compact form:
Pr(H1 | M1) = L1π1L1π1 +∑Ni=2 Liπi . (2)
The likelihood for any person i other than the suspect,
that is, the conditional probability of the observed corre-
spondence given that some person other than the suspect
is the source of the crime stain, depends on the occurrence
of the corresponding features in the population: Pr(M1 |
Hi) = Li = γ , for i = 1. Moreover, the probability that
some person other than the suspect is the source of the
crime stain is the complement of the probability that the
suspect is the source. Therefore,
∑N
i=2 πi = 1 − π1. The
term
∑N









πi = γ (1 − π1) .
Assuming that the suspect will certainly match if he is in
fact the source of the crime stain, Pr(M1 | H1) = L1 = 1,
the posterior probability π ′1 that the suspect is the source
of the crime stain, after considering the evidenceM1, thus
is as follows:
π ′1 = Pr(H1 | M1) =
π1
π1 + γ (1 − π1) . (3)
Bayesian network for the island problem
The result from the previous section can be tracked in a
Bayesian network as shown in Figure 1i.
This model contains the following elements:
1. Node N . This is a numeric node with
states 2, 10, 100, and 1,000 (other numbers may
obviously be chosen) and represents the size of the
suspect population, that is, the individuals which
could have left the crime stain.
2. Node H . This node has two states. The state H1
represents the proposition ‘The suspect is the source
of the crime stain’. The state H¯1 represents the
composite proposition ‘one of the other N − 1
individuals is the source of the crime stain’. It is an
aggregation of all propositions Hi (for i = 2, ...,N).
The probability table of node H contains
probability π1 = 1/N for the state H1
and (N − 1)/N (which is equivalent to (1 − π1)) for
the state H¯1 (see Table 1).
3. Node γ . This node contains numeric states that
represent the rate at which the corresponding
genetic feature appears in the population. For the
purpose of illustration, the values 0.01 and 0.1 are


































Figure 1 Compact and expanded representations of a Bayesian
network for a one stain one oﬀender case. (i) Formal outline of a
Bayesian network for evaluating a correspondence (M1) between the
proﬁle of a crime stain and that of a sample from a suspect, according
to Equation 3. The setting relates to one in which the population of
potential oﬀenders is of size N and either the suspect (H1) or one of
the other N − 1 individuals (H¯1) is the source of the crime stain
(proposition H). The corresponding genetic feature occurs in the
populationwith rate γ . (ii) Evaluation of a situation in which the size of
the population is N = 100, γ is 0.01, and the suspect’s proﬁle is found
to correspond to that of the crime stain (M1). The posterior probability
that the suspect is the source of the crime stain, Pr(H1 | M1), is shown
in the node H. It takes the value 0.5025. Instantiated node states are
shown in bold, and probabilities are displayed in percentages.
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Table 1 Probability table for node H
N: 2 10 100 1,000
H1 0.5 0.1 0.01 0.001
H¯1 0.5 0.9 0.99 0.999
Conditional probabilities assigned to the states H1 and H¯1 of the node H.
necessary. It would also be possible to specify γ
directly in the probability table of the nodeM1. A
representation of γ in terms of a distinct node is
retained here for the reason of providing a detailed
decomposition of the problem at hand.
4. NodeM1. This node has two statesM1 (‘The
suspect’s proﬁle corresponds to that of the crime
stain’) and M¯1 (‘The suspect’s proﬁle does not
correspond to that of the crime stain’). If the suspect
is in fact the source of the crime stain (that is,
proposition H1 holds), then the correspondence,M1,
is assumed to occur with certainty (irrespective of
the rarity of the corresponding characteristic,
expressed by γ ). Otherwise (that is, H¯1 being true),
the correspondence occurs as a function of the rate γ
with which the corresponding feature appears in the
population. The probability table of the nodeM1
thus completes as shown in Table 2.
An important aspect of the current development is
that the scientiﬁc evidence is conﬁned solely to the fact
that the suspect’s proﬁle is found to correspond with the
proﬁle of the crime stain. Nothing is said about howmem-
bers of the remaining N − 1 individuals compare to the
crime stain.
For the purpose of illustration, let us assume that the
size of the suspect population is N = 100, and the
rate γ at which the corresponding genetic characteris-
tic occurs in the population is 0.01. Further, according to
Equation 3 and assuming a prior probability of 1/N for
each of the N individuals, the probability that the stain
comes from the suspect is 0.01/(0.01+0.01×(1−0.01)) =
0.5025. This result can also be found via the proposed
Bayesian network. A visual illustration of this is given in
Figure 1ii. The instantiated nodes (that is, nodes set to the
state ‘known’) are shown in bold. The target probability,
Pr(H1 | M1), is displayed in the node H.
Table 2 Probability table for nodeM
H: H1 H¯1
γ : 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1
M1 1 1 0.01 0.1
M¯1 0 0 0.99 0.9
Conditional probabilities assigned to the statesM1 and M¯1 of the nodeM.
When some islanders are in a database
Formal analysis
The island problem as described in the previous section
is now slightly modiﬁed. It will still be assumed that the
variable N represents the size of the total population.
However, the analysis will suppose that the DNA proﬁles
of the ﬁrst 1, ..., n individuals (where index 1 is that of the
suspect) are in a database. The individuals (n+1), ...,N are
outside the database. Also part of the assumptions in this
scenario is that the proﬁle of the crime stain is compared
to all n individuals. This search of the database reveals
that only the proﬁle of the suspect corresponds to the pro-
ﬁle of the crime stain. This correspondence is denoted,
as before, by M1. Besides, the database search has also
revealed that the 2, ..., n individuals on the database other
than the suspect do not match. The fact that a proﬁle of
an individual i (for i = 2, ..., n) does not correspond to
the crime stain is denoted here by Xi. We can thus write
X2&X3&...&Xn for the information that all entries of the
database other than that of the suspect do not correspond.
The latter two items of evidence need to be jointly eval-
uated, so let us write, following [18], the totality of the
evidence as En = M1&X2&X3&...&Xn.
Considering that there are n of the N individuals in a
database leads to a minor reﬁnement in the way in which
the source level propositions Hi (for i = 2, ...,N) are
formulated. In fact, they can now be framed as ‘the indi-
vidual i in the database is the source of the crime stain’.
A more conceptual underpinning of the latter proposi-
tions is that they refer to individuals who had their DNA
proﬁle compared to that of the crime stain. This is a
diﬀerence with respect to the individuals (n + 1), ...,N
whose proﬁles were not compared. On the whole, one
can thus think of the population of size N as a splitting
into n individuals as database members and N − n that
are not. This splitting becomes apparent when rewriting
the posterior probability deﬁned earlier in Equation 1.
Writing this probability for the evidence En gives
the following:
Pr(H1|En) = Pr(En | H1)Pr(H1)(Pr(En |H1)Pr(H1)+∑ni=2 Pr(En |Hi)Pr(Hi)
+∑Ni=n+1 Pr(En | Hi)Pr(Hi)
) .
(4)
Alternatively, invoking the abbreviated notation, this
formula takes the following form:
π ′1 = Pr(H1 |En) =
L1π1
L1π1 +∑ni=2 Liπi +∑Ni=n+1 Liπi .
(5)
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Since it is still assumed here that the initial probabili-
ties Pr(Hi) are given by 1/N , it becomes relevant to draw
attention to the likelihoods Pr(En | Hi) because they will
determine whether or not the posterior probability of H1
given En (Equation 4) is diﬀerent from the posterior prob-
ability of H1 knowing only the match of the suspect, M1
(Equation 1), and nothing about the matching status of all
the individuals other than the suspect.
Consider the following:
1. Pr(En | H1). This term represents the probability that
the suspect’s proﬁle corresponds to that of the crime
stain and that none of the other n − 1members on
the database correspond, given that the suspect is the
source of the crime stain. The suspect is assumed to
match certainly, if he is in fact the source, whereas
each of the n − 1 individuals may correspond with
probability γ . The probability that none of the latter
individuals corresponds thus is (1 − γ )n−1. We can
thus write Pr(En | H1) = 1 × (1 − γ )n−1, or
L1 = (1 − γ )n−1 for short.
2. Pr(En | Hi), for i = 2, ..., n. This term represents the
likelihood for the other n − 1 individuals in the
database. Clearly, given the stated assumptions about
the reliability of the typing DNA technique, one
would expect to have a match among the n − 1
individuals on the database if the true source is
among them. Therefore, the probability of
observing En, that is, a match with the suspect but
with none of the other n − 1 database members, is
zero: Li = 0 for i = 2, ..., n.
3. Pr(En | Hi), for i = n + 1, ...,N . This term represents
the likelihood for each individual outside the
database. If one of the i = n + 1, ...,N individuals is
the source of the crime stain, then the suspect may
match with probability γ , and all members on the
database other than the suspect will ‘not’ match with
probability (1 − γ )n−1. Therefore, the likelihood
that Li for each individual i = n + 1, ...,N
is γ (1 − γ )n−1.
Equation 5 thus changes to become the following:









= (1 − γ )
n−1π1
(1 − γ )n−1π1+∑Ni=n+1 γ (1 − γ )n−1πi .
(6)
In the denominator, the constant γ (1 − γ )n−1 can be
taken out of the sum. In addition, (1 − γ )n−1 cancels in
both the numerator and the denominator. This leaves one
with the following:
π ′1 = Pr(H1 | En) =
π1
π1 + γ ∑Ni=n+1 πi . (7)
The logic of this result is that the second term in
the denominator, γ
∑N
i=n+1 πi, is smaller than γ (1 − π1)
in Equation 3. This latter expression involves a sum of
prior probabilities over the entire population (with no
one except the suspect being in the database) minus the
suspect. The former, in Equation 7, involves only a sum
over those members of the population which are not
in the database. Stated otherwise, the prior probabilities
for the individuals in the database which are found to
have proﬁles diﬀerent from that of the crime stain can-
cel because of the multiplication with the zero likelihoodf.
Because of a smaller denominator, the posterior probabil-
ity π ′1 in Equation 7 turns out to be greater than that in
Equation 3. The selection of a suspect in a database along
with an exclusion of other database members by DNA evi-
dence thus reunites more evidence against the matching
suspect.
Bayesian network for a database search setting: suspect and
one other individual in the database
The Bayesian network earlier described in Figure 1 can
serve as a starting point for extending analyses to sit-
uations involving the search of a database. In order to
point this out in a stepwise procedure, let us start with
a situation in which there are only two individuals in the
database (n = 2), the suspect and one other person. The
following modiﬁcations are introduced in the graphical
model (see also Figure 2):
1. Node H . A distinct proposition H2 is introduced. It
refers to the proposition according to which the
individual 2 - the second individual on the database
besides the suspect - is the source of the crime stain.
As before (section ‘Bayesian network for the island
problem’), the proposition H1 states that the suspect
(that is, the individual indexed as 1) is the source of
the crime stain. The previous proposition H¯1,
accounting for all individuals in the population of
size N except the suspect, is modiﬁed to H3 N . This
latter proposition speciﬁes that the true source is
among the N − n individuals outside the database (as
noted above, n is set to 2 for the time being). The
probability table of the node H completes as follows
(n = 2):
Pr(H1 | N) = Pr(H2 | N) = 1/N ,
Pr(H3 N | N) = (N − n)/N .







Figure 2 Bayesian network for assessing a single database ‘hit’.
Structure of a Bayesian network for evaluating a correspondence (M1)
between the proﬁle of a crime stain and that of a sample from a
suspect when the suspect is on a database along with n − 1 other
individuals whose DNA proﬁles do not correspond. The size of the
population of potential oﬀenders is N. Among the N individuals, n
(with n < N) are on a database. The node H has three states: ‘the
suspect is the source of the crime stain’ (H1), ‘the second individual in
the database is the source of the crime stain’ (H2), and ‘the source of
the crime stain is among the N − n (here, n = 2) individuals outside
the database’ (H3 N). The corresponding genetic feature occurs in the
population with rate γ . The node X2 is binary and represents the
proposition according to which the proﬁle of individual 2 (in the
database) does not correspond to the crime stain.
It is still assumed that, initially, each member of the
population of size N has the same probability of
being the source of the crime stain.
2. Node X2. This is a newly introduced binary node
with states X2, deﬁned as ‘the proﬁle of individual 2
in the database does not correspond to the crime
stain proﬁle’, and X¯2, deﬁned as ‘the proﬁle of
individual 2 corresponds to that of the crime stain’.
For situations in which individual 2 is not the source
of the crime stain, the probability that it will
nevertheless be found to correspond depends on the
rarity of the characteristic. Therefore, node X2
depends on the node γ . The probability table for the
node X2 completes as shown in
Table 3.
3. NodeM1. The deﬁnition of this node is the same as
that given earlier in the section ‘Bayesian network for
the island problem’. However, an extension of the
probability table is necessary because of the modiﬁed
states of the node H . This is shown in
Table 4.
In order to investigate the properties of the proposed
Bayesian network, consider again a setting in which the
population of potential sources is of sizeN = 100, and the
Table 3 Probability table for node X2
H: H1 H2 H3 N
γ : 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1
X2 0.99 0.9 0 0 0.99 0.9
X¯2 0.01 0.1 1 1 0.01 0.1
Conditional probabilities assigned to the states X2 and X¯2 of the node X2 .
rarity of the crime stain genotype is γ = 0.01. Introduc-
ing the evidence M1, that is, a correspondence between
the DNA proﬁle of the suspect and that of the crime stain
changes the prior probability of Pr(H1) = 1/N = 0.01
into a posterior probability of Pr(H1 | M1) = 0.5025. This
is a result found earlier in the ‘Bayesian network for the
island problem’ section. As shown in Figure 3i, the calcu-
lations in the Bayesian network constructed in this section
lead to the same ﬁnding.
At this point, nothing has been communicated yet to
the Bayesian network about whether or not the second
individual on the database, besides the suspect, has a cor-
responding proﬁle. Notwithstanding, something can be
said about the probability that the second individual in
the database would match. As shown in Figure 3i, the
probability that individual 2 would not match (that is,
state X2 being true), given knowledge of M1, is 0.985.
The logic of this result can be derived from the Bayesian
network. In fact, that probability is the sum of the prod-
ucts of the conditional probabilities of X2 given each
state of the node H and the actual probabilities of these
latter states:
Pr(X2 | M1) = Pr(X2 | H1)Pr(H1 | M1)
+ Pr(X2 | H2)Pr(H2 | M1)
+ Pr(X2 | H3 N )Pr(H3 N | M1)
(8)
Given that individual 2 is taken to match with certainty
if that individual is in fact the source of the crime stain,
one has Pr(X2 | H2) = 0. Consequently, the term in the
center of Equation 8 cancels. Under the remaining propo-
sitions, individual 2 matches with probability (1 − γ ).
Using shorthand notation for the posterior probabilities
Table 4 Modiﬁed probability table for nodeM1
H: H1 H2 H3 N
γ : 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1
M1 1 1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1
M¯1 0 0 0.99 0.9 0.99 0.9
Conditional probabilities assigned to the statesM1 and M¯1 of the nodeM1 .









































































Figure 3 Expanded representations of a Bayesian network for assessing a single database ‘hit’. Bayesian network (with nodes shown in
expanded form) for evaluating a correspondence between the proﬁle of a suspect and that of a crime stain, as deﬁned in Figure 2. Fixed node states
are shown in bold. The network (i) shows an evaluation of the information that the suspect’s proﬁle is found to correspond (M1 = true) when
N = 100 and γ = 0.01. The posterior probability that the suspect is the source of the crime stain is shown by the state H1 in the node H. The
network (ii) shows a situation in which the additional information about the second (non-matching) individual on the database is known.
Probabilities are shown in percentages.
of H deﬁned earlier in the text, Equation 8 becomes the
following:
Pr(X2 | M1) = (1 − γ )π ′1 + (1 − γ )π ′3 N
= (1 − γ )(π ′1 + π ′3 N )
= 0.99 × (0.5025 + 0.4925) = 0.9850 .(9)
As a next step in analyzing the proposed Bayesian net-
work, one can consider the incorporation of knowledge
about individual 2. For the purpose of the current discus-
sion, assume that this person is found not to correspond.
This amounts to considering X2 to be true. Introducing
this information into the Bayesian network leads to the
result shown in Figure 3ii. As may be seen, the probabil-
ity that the suspect is the source of the crime stain has
increased from 0.5025 to 0.5051. This latter result corre-
sponds to that which is obtained by applying Equation 7.
The Bayesian network discussed here provides a means
to make plain the changes in the source level propo-
sitions H through the consideration of the result of a
database search. By saying that individual 2 does not cor-
respond, H2 is ‘falsiﬁed’: as can be seen in Figure 3ii, the
state H2 of the node H now has a zero probability. As
a logical implication, the probability previously assumed
by this state must be ‘redistributed’ among the remain-
ing propositions H1 and H3 N , and this explains why their
probabilities change in the described way.
A reverse analysis of the database search problem
The analysis of the currently discussed Bayesian net-
work has allowed to point out two known aspects of the
database search issue:
1. One aspect is that information about the result of a
database search represents an additional item of
evidence.
2. A second aspect is that information about non-
matching individuals in a database tends to increase
the strength of the evidence against the suspect.
As pointed out at the end of the previous section, the
logic of the strengthened evidence against a matching sus-
pect can be understood by considering that the circle of
potential suspects is reduced when ﬁnding non-matching
individuals.
In order to illustrate these ideas in some further way,
one can rely on the fact that the ﬁnal result of applying
the Bayes’ theorem is invariant to the order of sequen-
tially applied items of evidence. Consider this in terms
of a particular example in which the true source of the
crime stain is among only three persons (that is, N = 3)
and the suspect is one of them. Consequently, one has the
three propositions H1,H2 and H3 with initial probabili-
ties πi = 1/N = 1/3 (for i = 1, 2, 3). Assume further,
as before, that two individuals are in a database, that is,
the suspect and one other person (thus, n = 2). That
other person, individual 2, has a DNA proﬁle that dos not
correspond to that of the crime stain. This information
is denoted as X2. It is possible to calculate the posterior
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probability that the suspect is the source of the crime
stain given the ‘sole’ information that individual 2 does
not correspond. Let us write this (intermediate) posterior
probability as π∗1 = Pr(H1 | X2). It is obtained as follows:
π∗1 = Pr(H1 | X2)
= Pr(X2 | H1)Pr(H1)(




Under H2, it is not possible that X2 is true. Therefore,
the term in the center of the denominator cancels. Given
that the other likelihoods Li (for i = 1, 3) are equalg, as
well as the prior probabilities πi (for i = 1, 3), this leaves
one with the following:
π∗1 = Pr(H1 |X2) =
Pr(X2 | H1)Pr(H1)
Pr(X2 | H1)Pr(H1) + Pr(X2 | H3)Pr(H3)
= L1π1L1π1 + L3π3 =
(1 − γ )πi
2(1 − γ )πi = 0.5 .
(11)
The initial probability that the suspect is the source of
the crime stain has thus increased from 1/3 to 1/2. This is
an expression of the ‘redistribution’ of probability among
two instead of three individuals who are equally likely to
be the source of the crime stain.
To some extent, this inference problem is comparable to
the Monty Hall puzzle, also known as ‘Let’s make a deal’,
a televised American game show hosted by Monty Hall.
In that game, the contestant will learn about which of the
three doors does not hide a prize. Based upon this infor-
mation, the contestant is concerned with re-evaluatingh
the probability with which the remaining two doors hide
the prize.
As a next step, one can add the information about the
correspondence between the suspect’s proﬁle and that of
the crime stain, M1. The intermediate posterior prob-
ability of H1 given knowledge about the non-matching
individual 2, X2, provides the ‘new prior’ for this. Assum-
ing independence between X2 and M1 given H , Bayes’
theorem can be written as follows:
π ′1 = Pr(H1 | X2,M1) =
Pr(M1 | H1)Pr(H1 | X2)(
Pr(M1 | H1)Pr(H1 | X2)
+Pr(M1 | H3)Pr(H3 | X2)
)
= Pr(M1 | H1)π
∗
1
Pr(M1 | H1)π∗1 + Pr(M1 | H3)π∗3
.
(12)
The suspect will certainly be found to correspond
under H1, whereas under H3, he will do so with
probability γ . Given that π∗1 = π∗3 = 0.5 from
Equation 11, the posterior π ′1 can be found to be 0.5/(0.5+
γ ∗ 0.5) = 0.990099.
The same result is obtained when applying both M1
and X2 to the π1 = 1/3 prior in a single step. In fact,
using E2 = {M1,X2} in Equation 6 with π1 = π3 = 1/3
leads to the following:
π ′1 = Pr(H1 | En) =
L1π1
L1π1 +∑ni=2 Liπi +∑Ni=n+1 Liπi
= (1 − γ )π1
(1 − γ )π1 + γ (1 − γ )π3 = 0.990099 .
(13)
These results can also be tracked within the currently
discussed Bayesian network. Figure 4 shows the starting
point that is characterized by the population of sizeN = 3
and the rarity γ = 0.01 of the corresponding genetic trait.
Initially, the probability that the suspect will be found to
correspond is given by the following:
Pr(M1) = Pr(M1 | H1)Pr(H1) + Pr(M1 | H2)Pr(H2)
+ Pr(M1 | H3)Pr(H3)
= 1 × π1 + γπ2
+ γπ3 = 1/3 + 2/3γ = 0.34 .
The probability that individual 2 will not correspond,
X2, is also given by the logic of the ‘extension of the
conversation’:
Pr(X2) = Pr(X2 | H1)Pr(H1) + Pr(X2 | H2)Pr(H2)
+ Pr(X2 | H3)Pr(H3)
= (1 − γ )π1 + 0 × π2
+ (1 − γ )π3 = 2/3(1 − γ ) = 0.66 .
Figure 4ii shows the state of the Bayesian network
after consideration of the fact that individual 2 does
not correspond to the crime stain. This changes the
1/N = 1/3 prior for π1 to π∗1 = 0.5, as found through
Equation 11. Accordingly, the probability of ﬁnding the
suspect to correspond,M1, increases to the following:
Pr(M1 | X2) = Pr(M1 | H1)π∗1 + Pr(M1 | H3)π∗3
= 1 × 0.5 + γ 0.5 = 0.505 .





































































































Figure 4 Expanded representations of a Bayesian network for assessing a single ‘hit’ in a database of reduced size. Bayesian network (with
nodes shown in expanded form) for evaluating a correspondence between the proﬁle of a suspect and that of a crime stain, as deﬁned earlier in
Figure 2. Fixed node states are shown in bold. The network (i) represents an initial situation in which the size of the population is N = 3, and the
corresponding characteristic occurs with probability γ = 0.01. (ii) The state of the Bayesian network after introducing information about the
non-matching individual 2 (that is, X2). (iii) The state of the Bayesian network after adding the information that the suspect’s proﬁle corresponds to
that of the crime stain (that is,M1). Probabilities are shown in percentages.
A last step then consists in adding the information that
the suspect corresponds,M1. This is shown in Figure 4iii.
In this ﬁgure, the node H displays the posterior probabil-
ity Pr(H1 | X2,M1) = π ′1 = 0.9901, which agrees with the
ﬁnding of Equation 13.
Bayesian network for a search of a database of size n > 2
So far in this paper, the discussion of Bayesian networks
has focused on situations in which there was no database
(that is, the ‘island problem’) or a database with only two
entries (that is, the suspect and one other individual). This
way of presentation allows one to point out the logic of the
approach in situations where the results are immediately
compelling. The proposed Bayesian network procedure
can however be extended to arbitrary numbers of N (that
is, size of suspect population) and n (that is, database size),
with N ≥ n. Hereafter, this is outlined in some further
detail.
Figure 5 represents a generalization of the Bayesian net-
work shown in Figure 2 to situations in which the size
of the database n is greater than 2 (with n ≤ N). The
following modiﬁcations are introduced:
1. The size of a database is modeled explicitly in terms
of a distinct node n with exemplary numerical
states 2, 10, 100 (other database sizes n ≤ N may
obviously be chosen).
2. The node H has three states. H1 represents the
proposition according to which the suspect is the
source of the crime stain. The proposition according
to which one of the individuals 2, ..., n is the source of
the crime stain is represented by the state H2 n. The
third state is Hn+1 N . It represents the proposition
that one of the N −n individuals outside the database
is the source of the crime stain. Assuming again prior
probabilities of 1/N for each of the N individuals, the
following node probabilities are speciﬁed:
Pr(H1) = 1/N , Pr(H2 N ) = n − 1/N ,








Figure 5 Bayesian network for a search of a database of size
n> 2. Structure of a Bayesian network for evaluating a
correspondence (M1) between the proﬁle of a crime stain and that of
a sample from a suspect when the suspect is on a database along
with n − 1 other individuals. The size of the population of potential
oﬀenders is N where n (with n ≤ N) of them are on a database. The
node H has three states: ‘the suspect is the source of the crime stain’
(H1), ‘one of the n − 1 other individuals in the database is the source
of the crime stain’ (H2 n), and ‘the source of the crime stain is among
the N − n individuals outside the database’ (Hn+1 N). The
corresponding genetic feature occurs in the population with rate γ .
The node X2&...&Xn is binary and represents the proposition according
to which the proﬁles of the n − 1 individuals in the database, other
than the suspect, do not correspond to the crime stain.
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3. The probability table for the nodeM1, the
proposition according to which the suspect’s proﬁle
corresponds, contains the following values:
Pr(M1 | Hi, γ ) =
{
1, i = 1,
γ , i = 1 .
4. The node X2&...&Xn represents the proposition
according to which the n − 1 individuals in the
database other than the suspect have proﬁles that do
not correspond to that of the crime stain. The node
probability table contains the following assignments:
Pr(X2&...&Xn | Hi, n, γ ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1 − γ )n−1, i = 1,
0, i = 2, ..., n,
(1 − γ )n−1, i = n + 1, ...,N .
Figure 6 provides a graphical illustration of the Bayesian
network described in this section. In Figure 6i, the initial
situation is one with the database of size n = 100, which
equals the size of the population of potential oﬀenders,
N. As a deﬁnitional implication of this, the prior proba-
bility for the suspect being the source of the crime stain
is 1/N = 0.01 and that for the n − 1 individuals in the
database other than the suspect is given by the comple-
ment, (N − 1)/N = 0.99. Because there are no potential
sources outside the database, the initial probability of the
proposition Hn+1 N is zero. Figure 6ii illustrates the eﬀect
of learning that none of the individuals 2, ..., n has a proﬁle
matching that of the crime stain. This has two logical
consequences. Firstly, the proposition H2 n must be false.
Secondly, probability must thus be ‘redistributed’ among
the remaining ‘possible’ propositions. The proposition H1
is the only one of this kind. It thus assumes probability 1.
A Bayesian network guided derivation of the ‘database
search likelihood ratio’
So far in this paper, the discussion has concentrated on
the evaluation of database search results given multiple
propositions. In fact, each individual i of the population
of potential sourcesi (of size N) was considered in terms
of a distinct proposition Hi. In order to facilitate the pre-
sentation, the i propositions have been grouped: H1 refers
to the suspect only, H2 n refers to the n − 1 individuals
in the database other than the suspect, and Hn+1 N refers
to the individuals outside the database. The consideration
of multiple proposition has directed the analysis to poste-
rior probabilities of the single proposition H1 (that is, ‘the
suspect is the source of the crime stain’). Likelihood ratios
have not primarily been addressed here because they com-
pare propositions in pairs. In the analysis of scientiﬁc evi-
dence, likelihood ratios play an important role, however,
so that it is desirable to include them in this discussion.
A general likelihood ratio procedure for comparing
more than two propositions has been described, for exam-
ple, by [34]. It will be used hereafter to derive a likeli-
hood ratio with reference to the Bayesian network shown
in Figure 5. It starts by grouping the propositions H2 n
andHn+1 N as the proposition H¯1. It represents the propo-
sition according to which the crime stain comes from
some other person than the suspect (either from some
other person in the database or from someone outside the
database). This proposition forms a pair along with H1,
that is, ‘the suspect is the source of the crime stain’.
Following considerations outlined in the section ‘Bayesian
network for a search of a database of size n > 2’,
let X2&...&Xn denote the evidence that none of the n − 1
individuals in the database has a DNA proﬁle correspond-
ing to that of the crime stain. Assuming that the prior
probabilities for each of the propositions Hi can be given,

















































































Figure 6 Expanded representations of a Bayesian network for a search of a database of size n> 2. Bayesian network shown in Figure 5 with
expanded representation of nodes. (i) A situation in which the size of the database n equals that of the suspect population N = 100. The rarity of
the corresponding characteristic is set to 0.01. (ii) The additional information about the n − 1 non-matching individuals of the database is
introduced. Probabilities are shown in percentages.
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of the pair of propositions H1 and H¯1, called database
likelihood ratio here (LRDB), can be evaluated as follows:
LRDB = Pr(X2&...&Xn | H1)Pr(X2&...&Xn | H¯1)
= Pr(X2&...&Xn | H1){
∑N
i=2 Pr(Hi)}∑N
i=2 Pr(X2&...&Xn | Hi)Pr(Hi)
. (14)









The ﬁrst part of this sum cancels because the likelihoods
for the n − 1 individuals in the database, other than the
suspect, are zero. The likelihood ratio, Equation 14, thus
reduces to the following:
LRDB = Pr(X2&...&Xn | H1)Pr(X2&...&Xn | H¯1)
= Pr(X2&...&Xn | H1){
∑N
i=2 Pr(Hi)}∑N
i=n+1 Pr(X2&...&Xn | Hi)Pr(Hi)
. (15)
The likelihood for the suspect and the individuals out-
side the database is (1 − γ )n−1. The prior probability for
each individual i to be the source of the crime stain is, as
it was assumed throughout this paper, 1/N . Equation 15
can thus be rewritten as follows:
LRDB = (1 − γ )
n−1 N−1
N∑N
i=n+1(1 − γ )n−1 1N
= (1 − γ )
n−1 N−1
N
(1 − γ )n−1∑Ni=n+1 1N
= (1 − γ )
n−1 N−1
N
(1 − γ )n−1 N−nN
= N − 1N − n . (16)
According to this result, the likelihood ratio is maximal
when the size of the database, n, equals that of the popula-
tion of potential sources, N. The logic of this result is also
illustrated by the Bayesian network depicted in Figure 6ii.
It shows that knowledge of X2&...&Xn implies the truth
of H1 in a setting in which N = n. Conversely, if the sus-
pect is the only person in the database (n = 1), this means
that there is no information about excluded individuals.
Accordingly, with n = 1, the value for LRDB is one.
The Bayesian network discussed so far (Figure 5) can
be adapted in order to illustrate a likelihood ratio evalu-
ation. As a minor modiﬁcation, it is necessary to add a
summary node H1 with two states H1 (‘the suspect is the
source of the crime stain’) and H¯1 (‘some person other
than the suspect is the source of the crime stain’). The
latter state regroups the two propositionsH2 n andHn+1 N
of the nodeH. The nodeH1 is added as a descendant of the
nodeH. The probability table contains the logical values 0
and 1 as shown in Table 5.
This extension is shown in Figure 7. The ﬁgure on the
left shows an evaluation of the numerator of the likeli-
hood ratio. The node H1 is set to H1 which implies also
that that node H will display H1 as ‘true’. Because the rar-
ity of the characteristic γ is set to 0.01 and the size of
the database n to 100, the probability that none of the
other n − 1 individuals in the database has a correspond-
ing proﬁle is (1 − γ )n−1 = 0.9999 = 0.3697. This value is
shown in the node X2&...&Xn.
The evaluation of the denominator is shown in
Figure 7ii. Here, the nodeH1 is set to H¯1. This implies that
the state H1 in the node H is zero. Accordingly, proba-
bility is redistributed proportionally among the remaining
propositionsH2 n andHn+1 N . In fact, if the suspect is not
the source of the crime stain (that is, H¯1 is true), then (a)
there is a probability of (n−1)/(N−1) = 99/999 = 0.0991
that someone other than the suspect inside the database
is the source of the crime stain, and (b) there is a prob-
ability of (N − n)/(N − 1) = 900/999 = 0.9009 that
someone outside the database is the source of the crime
stain. These two probabilities are displayed in the node H.
Finally, the probability that none of the n−1 individuals in
the database (other than the suspect) matches, given that
the suspect is not the source of the crime stain, is given as
follows:
Pr(X2&...&Xn |H¯1) = Pr(X2&...&Xn |H2 n)Pr(H2 n |H¯1)
+Pr(X2&...&Xn |Hn+1 N )Pr(Hn+1 N |H¯1)
= 0 × (n − 1)/(N − 1)
+(1 − γ )n−1 × (N − n)/(N − 1)
= 0.9999 × 900/999 = 0.3331 .
This result is obtained in the node X2&...&Xn in
Figure 7ii.
More generally, it also worth noting that the evidential
value of ‘excluding’ indiviuals 2, ..., n does not depend on
the rarity of the compared analytical characteristic γ but
only on the size of the target population and the size of the
database. The evidence will be stronger or weaker depend-
ing on whether the database covers, respectively, a greater
or a smaller proportion of the population.
Table 5 Probability table for summary node H1
H: H1 H2 n Hn+1 N
H1 1 0 0
H¯1 0 1 1
Logical values assigned to the states H1 and H¯1 of the node H1 .


































































































Figure 7 Alternative representations of a Bayesian network for a search of a database of size n> 2. Bayesian network shown in Figure 5 with
expanded representation of nodes along with an additional node H1 with states H1 (‘the suspect is the source of the crime stain’) and H¯1 (‘some
person other than the suspect is the source of the crime stain (either someone else in the database or an individual outside the database)’). Both
ﬁgures show a situation in which the size n of the database equals 100 and that of the suspect population, N, equals 1,000. The rarity of the
corresponding characteristic is set to 0.01. (i) Illustration of the evaluation of the numerator of the likelihood ratio for the item of
information X2&...&Xn (that is, none of the n − 1 individuals in the database other than the suspect corresponds to the crime stain): H1 is set to ‘true’,
and the value of the numerator is shown in the node X2&...&Xn . (ii) An evaluation of the denominator of the likelihood ratio (that is, H¯1 is set to ‘true’).
Probabilities are shown in percentages.
Conclusions
Logically compelling argument has been presented in sci-
entiﬁc literature in support of the argument that excluding
individuals in a database represents evidence that tends to
strengthen the case against a matching suspect [18,35]. It
is widely conceded, however, that the associated mathe-
matics is not easy to explain, in particular to lay persons,
and even so in trial proceedings. It is therefore desirable
that, at least among forensic scientists and legal profes-
sionals, there is a common and agreed understanding of
the proofs and logic that support the prevalent scientiﬁc
opinion in this area.
However, within the scientiﬁc community, this seems to
be a diﬃcult endeavor. This is illustrated, for example, by
the critical debates that have at some point accompanied
the discussion of settings in which a suspect was selected
through a database search, as is illustrated by [14,36].
In some parts of the forensic community, opinions cur-
rently persist according to which a database search should
‘weaken’ a case against the suspect. A recent example for
this is a recommendation issued by the German Stain
Commission [33]. That document falls for the knownmis-
conception that it should be of concern that one is looking
for individuals that possess a proﬁle that corresponds to
the crime stain. This is motivated by the intuitively appeal-
ing but logically unfounded argument that (1) it is unsur-
prising to see that the suspect that is found as a result of
a database search will present the target proﬁle, and (2)
therefore, the corresponding crime stain proﬁle ought to
be of little or reduced evidential value. It seems that such
opinion is inﬂuenced by asking questions of the follow-
ing kind: ‘What are the chances of ﬁnding an individual
that has the crime stain genotype if one is searching for
individuals who could possess that genotype (for example,
by searching a database)?’ However, this is not a very help-
ful question because it does not serve well the needs of the
recipients of expert information. They rather seek infor-
mation regarding a question of the following kind: ‘Given
that a person was found with a proﬁle that corresponds to
that of a crime stain, what is the strength of the evidence
against this suspect?’
Asmentioned above, the principal routes of logical anal-
ysis lead to the conclusion that the case against a matching
suspect is strengthened when excluding other potential
donors. This may be pointed out either through analy-
ses of the posterior probability of the proposition that
the suspect is the source of the crime stain or through
a likelihood ratio analysis. The rigor of the analyses put
forward in literature is also paired with convincing impli-
cations in limiting cases, that is, when all potential sources
are excluded, then the procedures indicate that the only
matching suspect must be the crime stain donor.When no
individuals other than the suspect are investigated, then
the case against the suspect reduces to the evaluation of a
one-stain one-oﬀender case. Such a case may, within some
general assumptions, be assessed in terms of the inverse
of the random match probability [16].
Despite these entirely reasonable implications, both
widening the acceptance of these inferential procedures
as well as their teaching in education remains a chal-
lenging task. This topic has thus been made a principal
aim of analysis and discussion in this paper. The guiding
ideas throughout were twofold. Firstly, the database search
problem was discussed as a generalization of the island
problem. Secondly, all probabilistic analyses are system-
atically tracked within graphical models (that is, Bayesian
networks). The merit of a methodology with a graphical
support is that it allows one to point out that the various
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inferential procedures have common underlying patterns
of inference. Therefore, a Bayesian network approach is
not only helpful for examining the logic within a given
inferential procedure, but is also valuable for checking
the coherence between diﬀerent inferential approaches
(here: the relationship between the island problem and the
database search issue).
More generally, starting with the island problem is help-
ful because it is well posed. It is instructive to point out
the rationale of the argument in a ‘simple world’ context.
This can favor the understanding of the main principle of
the argument without possible distraction due to partic-
ular numerical settings. The inherent reason behind the
searching among islanders is that any individual found
to have a proﬁle other than that of the crime stain is
excluded− under the assumption of absence of laboratory
error− as a potential source. The pool of potential donors
thus becomes smaller with the corollary that the suspicion
against each remaining potential source must increase.
Stated otherwise, probability is to be redistributed among
fewer candidates.
The Bayesian network approach discussed in this paper
provides a clear illustration for this. In Figure 8, a case
with a population size N = 1, 000 and n = 100 is
considered, along with an analytical characteristic which
occurs with probability γ = 0.01. Knowing that the
individuals 2, ..., n do not correspond to the crime stain
sets the proposition H2 n, that one of the n − 1 indi-
viduals of the database is the source of the crime stain,
to zero. Accordingly, probability must be redistributed
among the propositions H1 (‘the suspect is the source
of the crime stain’) and Hn+1 N (‘the true source of the
crime stain is outside the database’). It then becomes
a question to know how this ought to be operated. If
one assumes that, initially, each individual i had the
same probability of being the source of the crime stain,
then Pr(Hi) = 1/N (for i = 0, 1, ...,N). Next, if one
excludes the individuals i = 2, ..., n, then the poste-
rior probability for the remaining individuals must reﬂect
‘a proportional increase’. For example, if the proposi-
tion for the suspect initially had a probability of 1/N , it
has 1/(N − n + 1) after excluding the n − 1 individuals
in the database (other than the suspect). This is shown in
the Bayesian network in Figure 8 where, after consider-
ation of the evidence X2&...&Xn, the proposition H1 has
the probability 1/(N − n + 1) = 0.00111 and the propo-
sition Hn+1 N has the probability (N − n)/(N − n + 1) =
0.99889.
The graphical display in the proposed Bayesian network
is particularly compelling. If probability from one proposi-
tion (here:H2 n) is taken, then it must well ‘go’ somewhere
because, on the whole, the condition
∑N
i=1 Pr(Hi) = 1
must remain satisﬁed. It is not conceivable that probability
is transferred exclusively to Hn+1 N , as suggested by pro-
ponents of a decreasing probative value due to a database
search. The reason for this is that with increasing database
size n, the number of distinct propositions (that is, indi-
viduals) subsumed under Hn+1 N decreases. By all logic,
the proposition H1 must thus be reinforced.
A Bayesian network approach was pursued in this paper
because it has the advantage of oﬀering a concise repre-
sentation and description of (1) the various components
(variables and probability assignments) that make up a
given inferential procedure as well as (2) their relation-
ships. From a purely descriptive point of view, the general
Bayesian network proposed here in Figure 5 allows one to
point out the following aspects:
1. The size of the database n and the size N of the















































Figure 8 Bayesian network for assessing the eﬀect of excluding individuals in a database. Bayesian network described earlier in Figure 7.
Illustration of a situation in which only the information about the n − 1 non-matching individuals in the database, other than the suspect, is
considered. The node H illustrates that this information leads to a posterior probability of 1 over the population size minus the excluded individuals
for the proposition that the suspect is the source of the crime stain: Pr(H1 | X2&...&Xn) = 1/(N − n + 1) = 0.00111. All probabilities are shown in
percentages. Further details are as given in the text.
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the distribution of probability among the competing
propositions of the node H.
2. The evidence in a database search scenario consists
of two distinct items of information. One of them is
the observed correspondence between the suspect’s
proﬁle and that of the crime stain. It depends on
whether the suspect is or is not the source of the
crime stain as well as on the rarity of the
corresponding analytical characteristic. Most
importantly, it is not directly depending on the size
of the database or the size of the population of
potential sources. A second item of information
pertains to the individuals in the database other than
the suspect, that is, the fact that these n − 1
individuals do not correspond to the proﬁle of the
crime stain. This variable does depend on the size of
the database as well as the rarity of the analytical
characteristic.
3. The matching suspect and the non-matching
individuals in the database are, as is implied by the
network’s graphical structure, distinct items of
evidence that are independent conditionally upon
knowledge of the target proposition H and the rarity
of the corresponding characteristic γ .
From a dynamic point of view, Bayesian networks allow
their user to track probabilistic calculations in many dif-
ferent ways. As pointed out throughout this paper, the
proposed Bayesian network supports the calculation of
both posterior probabilities as well as components of the
likelihood ratio. For example, the user can investigate the
eﬀect of the two distinct items of evidence sequentially,
irrespective of the order in which they are considered. An
important implication of this is that reducing the pool of
potential donors tends to strengthen the case against a
suspect. In particular, this can be considered even before
learning whether or not the suspect actually matches.
Stated otherwise, knowledge of the ‘matching status’ of
a suspect is not a necessary requirement for assessing
the probative value of excluding other individuals in the
database.
All of these aspects oﬀer valuable assistance in teach-
ing. The authors currently rely on Bayesian networks as
an approach to support and complement more formal
learning material used within their institution. Both the
construction and subsequent analysis of Bayesian net-
works with now widely available computer software is
found very helpful by students to learn about and fur-
ther the understanding of the mathematics that underly
diﬀerent evaluative procedures and legal problems in gen-
eral (as illustrated, for example, by the island problem).
Bayesian networks translate formal procedures within a
graphical environment which can actively be explored
by learners. This explanatory capacity makes Bayesian
networks particularly attractive for students who may ﬁnd
purely algebraic approaches diﬃcult to apprehend. More
generally, it is the hope of the authors that Bayesian net-
works could also support practitioners in ongoing debates
by illustrating the logic of probabilistic solutions .
Endnotes
a In the UK, for example, the national database was intro-
duced in 1995 [37] on the basis of the Criminal Justice
and Public Order Act. As a further example, New Zealand
introduced its database in 1996 [38].
b See also section ‘Evidential value of ‘database hits’: two
decades of debate’.
c As a point of comparison, the Swiss database contains
1.7% of the Swiss population, against 0.8% in Germany,
1.8% in France, and 2.5% in the USA.
d The European Convention on Human Rights does not
include the principle that courts have discretion to assess
evidence, but it applies in every European country [39].
e The Royal Statistical Society’s Statistics and the Law
Working Group is currently preparing a practitioner’s
guide on Bayesian networks and inferential reasoning.
The group’s ﬁrst report, Guide No 1, on the fundamentals
of probability and statistical evidence in criminal proceed-
ings [8] was published in November 2010.
f Let us recall that Li = 0 for i = 2, . . . , n.
g Individual 2 will not correspond with probability (1−γ )
if either the suspect or individual 3 is the true source of
the crime stain.
h The analogy drawn here is only that of making reference
to the general kind of inference problem. In reality, the
Monty Hall problem is slightly more subtle because it con-
tains the additional information about the initial choice of
a door by the contestant as well as the fact that the game
presenter will not open the door chosen by the contestant
nor that behind which the prize is.
i An assumption made here is that the individuals are
unrelated.
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